![]() 08/11/2015 at 12:28 • Filed to: None | ![]() | ![]() |
Have any Opponauts been snared by the Hwy 11 speed trap in
!!!error: Indecipherable SUB-paragraph formatting!!!
, near Bristol? I found out yesterday I had been snared by their demon speed camera... in June. Looked it up, and it seems that camera issues TENS OF THOUSANDS OF TICKETS. (story below)
Allegedly this is my final notice so I’ve waived appeal, blah blah (did I get a previous one? did I balls). Also, that stretch of 11 is 45mph for 1.3 miles instead of 55. Also also, that speed camera contributed one year the vast majority of Bluff City’s revenue from all sources. Further also, it’s so egregious that it’s come up in the state legislature multiple times, been the subject of multiple lawsuits, and got on one guy’s tits so much that he stole the BCPD’s domain name out from under them. Also infinity, Bluff City annexed that area, not in the main part of town, seemingly for the express purpose of extorting people in the past. Also aleph one, Arizona Traffic Solutions runs the camera, because of course they do.
I came through there at twilight (8:00PM), and cannot recall seeing notices of the camera, nor actually the speed limit sign. Heres’ a kicker, though: in the short video clip on their website, mere seconds before my car passes, a white Explorer comes past IN BETWEEN THE LANES at the same speed - mid-unsignaled dangerous lane change. So no, as he was between the trip sensors for the two lanes, there is almost no chance he was ticketed.
Me driving reasonably at the pace of most traffic, save a few people panic-slowing for the camera - fuck me, apparently.
Oh, and the crown turd on the mountain of nougatey poo goodness? The “ticket” says “speeding”. It does not state an amount of speeding alleged to have occurred. Bullshit.
It’s $50, no points, but with a processing fee for “convenient” payment online, etc. This after apparently failing to get the damn notice to me in a timely manner and depriving me of process there. Tempted to send them a Wachovia check registered mail (that’s what mine are - still valid) to dodge any more $ in the pocket of the shitbirds, with “quasi-legal highwayman operation” in the memo line and a formal FU letter. If they refuse to accept that, game on, fuckers.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 12:31 |
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![]() 08/11/2015 at 12:34 |
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No shit. My area doesn’t usually go full feudalism like that (I’ve only ever gotten one ticket before), so Waze isn’t high on my list of usefulness
normally.
I may need to rethink this when doing things out of town.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 12:36 |
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You got caught speeding, you admit in writing to speeding, and you also admit that you were negligent of any signage telling you the speed limit and that there is a speed camera present.
Pay the $50 + processing and stop wasting your time on it.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 12:42 |
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I admit their camera photo’d me - that part’s incontrovertible re: my freaking license plate on camera, but I also state that I have no specifics on the charge. Mostly, I contend that they are crooked dicks engaged in a revenue scheme and themselves negligent in multiple points, including actually extracting their money while following due process . That is all. Venting.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 12:45 |
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Next time, try going so fast that the camera can’t catch you. That seems the logical next move.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 12:57 |
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Your contention that they are crooked dicks engaged in a revenue scheme is duly noted and correct. However, they have not denied you due process because they have apparently sent you previous notice (their records should reflect as such) and you were given the opportunity for appeal, in case you weren’t driving the vehicle or it was stolen. You are entitled to adequate notice, a hearing, and a neutral judge. Without going into the issues presented by having a “neutral judge” being paid salary by the very traffic tickets he presides over, you were given adequate notice and the chance for a hearing, but apparently didn’t notice it.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 12:57 |
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sounds like that explorer is a pro. I think that section of the road is exactly where you need to change lanes from now on.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 13:05 |
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Didn’t notice it... or just didn’t receive it. I have no doubt they have in their records that they sent me previous notice. I’m pissed off that I never got it, for whatever reason. I suspect their competence, slightly, also their honesty. I’d like them to be required to send it registered mail, but that would no doubt cut into their margins. Without specific information on the charge, appeal on other grounds is also difficult, but I suspect that’s because they decided to operate on double-super-secret violation mode after getting people torqued off by 46-in-a-45 bullshit.
Also, Kinja suddenly inserting quote marks for replies is starting to annoy, but that’s unrelated.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 13:08 |
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I was under the impression that the cameras only registered a 10mph difference in speed from the posted limit. Seems to have worked so-far in Maryland for me.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 13:15 |
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One of the stories I ran across specifically mentioned a 46 in a 45. I think actually, not hyperbolically. Apparently, they got wise to things and decided to obfuscate what they’re really doing to make defense more difficult. They also had to suspend operations on this camera at one point due to having the limit change posted illegally close to the camera location. Taken with the zoning in of a penis-like strip of land extending onto the highway, this is a revenue operation, writ large. So large, in fact, it can be seen from space. It’s not in their interest to sign well or do anything else well beyond plausible deniability, nor have they done so in the past - hence “quasi-legal highwayman operation”. An extra $4 not going to ATS, a staff member actually having to open a damn envelope and unwrap the check - that’s worth mailing it, to me.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 13:21 |
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Go Office Space on the camera. Job done.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 13:21 |
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I remember reading that you don’t actually have to pay for speed camera tickets as they have no legal means to collect and it’s not an official traffic ticket. Maybe it varies by state, don’t know. It might be worth looking into, but I don’t have the ticket so I’m not going to spend any time looking for it.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 13:23 |
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I think there’s an argument to be made for getting a rental white Camry, taking the plate off, and doing loops so they get 20 “undefined”s each way in the space of a couple hours. The “If I’m going to get a ticket I want it to be from an actual cop for something I want to do” gambit.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 13:25 |
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Whether they’ve got legal means to collect or not may be irrelevant - the note explicitly states they send you to collections if you don’t pay. So, possibly not, but risks a legal battle to protect your credit.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 13:29 |
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He’s in North Carolina. They would find some way to screw him over on this.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 13:32 |
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So don’t go there, then. Besides, how on earth did you get YOUR 300D over 45 MPH?
#Your300DIsReallyA240D
![]() 08/11/2015 at 13:37 |
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Arbitrary speed limit dips, when I have that much trouble getting up to a posted speed in the first place, seem irritating.
![]() 08/11/2015 at 13:49 |
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....the Tennessee superior courts and house have begun phasing out all speed and/or traffic light cameras and have submitted litigation that video “evidence” is subject to challenge in court and may be eliminated from a court decision:
http://www.jacksonsun.com/story/news/201…
S T A T E O F T E N N E S S E E
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
PO BOX 20207
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37202
February 19, 2010
Opinion No. 10-17
Traffic Cameras
QUESTIONS
1. Do ordinances that create owner liability for traffic violations detected by
surveillance camera conflict with state statutory law?
2. Are municipal fines for traffic violations detected by surveillance camera civil or
criminal in nature for purposes of the constitutional protections that apply during court
proceedings?
3. Does admission of photographic evidence from a traffic surveillance camera
violate the Confrontation Clause?
OPINIONS
1. No. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-198 specifically authorizes owner liability in such
circumstances.
2. A federal court likely would conclude that such fines are civil in nature for
purposes of federal constitutional law. Under state law, the Tennessee Court of Appeals has
indicated that such a fine is civil for procedural and appellate issues, but that constitutional
protections are triggered by the fine. Such protections likely include the prohibition on double
jeopardy and the privilege against self-incrimination.
3. No. The Confrontation Clause embraces testimonial statements. Photographs are
not testimonial statements.
ANALYSIS
In Op. Tenn. Atty Gen. 08-178 (Nov. 26, 2008), this Office opined that the issuance of a
citation for traffic violations based on photographic evidence from a camera does not violate the
constitutional rights of the citizens of Tennessee to due process, to equal protection, and to
privacy. This opinion was based in large part on the holding of the Tennessee Court of Appeals
in City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that ordinance
establishing red-light camera enforcement program was not ultra vires, did not violate due
process by creating an impermissible presumption that owner was guilty party, did not violate
Page 2
owners right against self-incrimination, and did not violate owners rights to equal protection),
perm. app. denied Feb. 17, 2009. Brown remains good law. See, e.g., City of Knoxville v.
Kimsey, No. E2008-00850-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 1325719 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2009)
(citing Brown with approval, and rejecting constitutional challenges to red-light camera
enforcement ordinance on due process and privilege against self-incrimination grounds).
We have been asked to further evaluate red light camera enforcement programs in light of
three recent pronouncements by other courts. In State v. Kuhlman, the Minnesota Supreme
Court invalidated an ordinance authorizing photo enforcement of traffic control signals on the
ground that it conflicted with state statutory law, raising the question whether municipal
ordinances in this state are similarly preempted by the Tennessee Code. See Kuhlman, 729
N.W.2d 577, 583-84 (Minn. 2007). Additionally, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee, passing on Knoxvilles Red Light Photo Enforcement Program, has
observed obiter dictum that, if the penalty imposed is criminal, “then a panoply of federal
constitutional rights, including the rights to confrontation and rights against self-incrimination,
arise.” Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 WL 782540, at *4 (E.D.
Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008), aff’d on other grounds, 582 F.3d 617 (6th Cir. 2009). In a related vein,
the United States Supreme Court has held that affidavits reporting the results of forensic analysis
are “testimonial” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, posing the question whether
photographic evidence derived from traffic cameras is susceptible to challenge under this
constitutional provision. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009). We
address these questions in turn.
1. The ordinance at issue in Kuhlman created only owner liability for red-light
violations detected by an automated traffic enforcement system, but a Minnesota statute imposed
liability on motor vehicle drivers for similar infractions. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d at 579-80. On
this basis, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the ordinance conflicted with the statute and
hence was preempted. Id. at 584; but see City of Davenport v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 542-
44 (Iowa 2008) (holding the opposite, and noting the disagreement with Kuhlman).
Tennessee law is different. As presently constituted, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-198
authorizes the use of traffic surveillance cameras and provides in pertinent part: “Except as
otherwise provided in this subsection (e), the registered owner of the motor vehicle shall be
responsible for payment of any notice of violation or citation issued as the result of a traffic light
monitoring system.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-198(e)(1). The subsection goes on to provide
means by which a vehicle owner may avoid liability by demonstrating that the vehicle was in the
care, custody, or control of another at the time of the violation, including circumstances in which
the vehicle or its plates were stolen. Id. § 55-8-198(e)(2) & (3).
Because Tennessee statutory law specifically authorizes owner liability for violations
detected by traffic light monitoring systems, local ordinances so providing are not susceptible to
challenge on the preemption grounds identified by the Kuhlman court. As a general matter,
municipal ordinances imposing liability for failing to obey the instructions of a traffic control
device must be consistent with state law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-307(a) (providing that
incorporated municipalities may adopt by reference certain provisions of the Tennessee Code
Page 3
relating to the operation of motor vehicles and “may by ordinance provide additional regulations
for the operation of vehicles within the municipality, which shall not be in conflict with the
provisions of the listed sections”); see also id. §§ 55-8-109, -110 (setting forth requirements for
operation of vehicles consistent with traffic control signals). For reasons that we trust are
apparent, this Office is unable to opine as to whether each of the various ordinances relating to
traffic surveillance cameras adopted by municipalities throughout the state are otherwise
consistent with the Tennessee Code. We observe, however, that the Tennessee Court of Appeals
has found Knoxvilles red-light camera enforcement program to be consistent with state law,
even though the pertinent ordinance was adopted prior to the enactment of Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 55-8-198. See Brown, 284 S.W.3d at 336.
2. The federal courts that have directly addressed municipal red-light camera
ordinances have concluded that the fines imposed are civil in nature for purposes of federal
constitutional law. See Kilper v. City of Arnold, No. 4:08cv0267, 2009 WL 2208404, at *13-19
(E.D. Mo. July 23, 2009); Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702, 713-17 (M.D.N.C.
2003), vacated in part on other grounds by Shavitz v. Guilford County Bd. of Educ., 100 Fed.
Appx. 146 (4th Cir. June 7, 2004); see also Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 566-68 (7th
Cir. 2009) (rejecting due process challenge to red-light camera enforcement program, noting “no
one has a fundamental right to run a red light or avoid being seen by a camera on a public street,”
and “[i]t is enough to say that photographs are at least as reliable as live testimony, that the due
process clause allows administrative decisions to be made on paper (or photographic) records
without regard to the hearsay rule, and that the procedures Chicago uses are functionally
identical to those it uses to adjudicate parking tickets. . . .” (citation omitted)). Noting that the
enacting bodies indicated a preference for a civil label, these courts went on to consider whether
the legislation was so punitive in purpose or effect that the proceeding or penalty should be
considered criminal in nature, employing the seven-factor test set forth in Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1997). See Kilper, 2009 WL 2208404, at *15; Shavitz, 270 F. Supp.
2d at 713. Because the sanctions at issue—relatively small fines—involved no affirmative
disability or restraint, were not historically viewed as punishment, required no scienter, promoted
public safety despite having a deterrent aspect and potential criminal label, and were not
excessive in relation to the public safety purpose, the courts concluded that the fines were civil in
nature. See Kilper, 2009 WL 2208404, at *15-17; Shavitz, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 714-16.
We consider these opinions to be well-reasoned, and likely to be followed by a federal
court passing on a municipal ordinance adopted consistently with Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-198.
In general, municipal courts possess jurisdiction to enforce ordinances mirroring a state criminal
statute only if the maximum penalty prescribed by the ordinance is “a civil fine” not exceeding
fifty dollars. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-18-302(a)(2); see also Town of Nolensville v. King, 151
S.W.3d 427, 433 (Tenn. 2004) (holding that Article VI, section 14, of the Tennessee Constitution
prohibits a municipal court judge from imposing fines in excess of fifty dollars for a violation of
a municipal ordinance absent a valid waiver of the right). Additionally, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-
198 specifies that a traffic citation that is based solely upon evidence obtained from a
surveillance camera is considered a non-moving violation, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-198(a),
which, as we have previously opined, “is similar to the issuance of a traffic ticket,” Op. Tenn.
Atty Gen. 08-178, at 4 (Nov. 26, 2008). In view of the evident preference for a civil label,
Page 4
together with the modest fine that municipal courts are empowered to assess, we think it unlikely
that a federal court would find a municipal red-light camera enforcement program in Tennessee
to be so punitive in purpose or effect that it should be considered criminal in nature for purposes
of federal law.
At the present juncture, state law is more expansive. In Brown, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals considered whether the fine imposed by Knoxvilles red-light camera enforcement
program was criminal in nature. Brown, 284 S.W.3d at 336. In addressing the question, the
court adopted the framework set forth in City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn.
2001), a case that considered whether a municipal monetary assessment was sufficiently punitive
to fall within the ambit of the Fifty-Dollar Fines Clause, Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 14. Davis
eschewed the seven Hudson guideposts, settling instead on an inquiry whether the “totality of the
circumstances demonstrates that the statutory scheme truly envisions the pecuniary sanction as
serving to remedy or to correct a violation.” Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 265. The Brown court noted
that Davis was not directly on point, since there was no issue as to whether the Fifty-Dollar Fines
Clause was implicated, but nonetheless concluded that Knoxvilles fine was punitive and
deterrent, rather than remedial, in nature. Brown, 284 S.W.3d at 338. Accordingly, the court
determined that the fine was civil “for procedural and appellate issues,” but that “constitutional
protections are triggered.” Id. In a footnote, the court left open the question whether the
privilege against self-incrimination is one such protection. Id. at 339 n.4.
Notwithstanding this holding, the Brown court specifically addressed whether
Knoxvilles red-light enforcement program violated due process by creating an “impermissible
rebuttable presumption of guilt against the owner of a vehicle,” and concluded that it did not. Id.
at 338-39. Again, Brown remains good law. This Office therefore adheres to its earlier opinion
that the issuance of citations for traffic violations based on photographic evidence from cameras
does not violate due process. Op. Tenn. Atty Gen. 08-178, at 5 (Nov. 26, 2008).
Brown nevertheless leaves open the question what constitutional provisions might be
implicated by municipal red-light camera enforcement programs. On the assumption that the
Davis analysis applies outside the context of the “unique” Fifty-Dollar Fines Clause, Davis, 54
S.W3d at 257—a question over which the Tennessee Supreme Court has not passed—the case
law suggests that the prohibition on double jeopardy and the privilege against self-incrimination
might obtain. The Davis decision noted that “in the specific context of a „civil proceeding for a
municipal ordinance violation, this Court has held that the imposition of a pecuniary sanction
triggers the protections of the double jeopardy clause to prevent a second „punishment in the
state courts for the same offense.” Id. at 261. Similarly, Brown itself recognized that the
privilege against self-incrimination might be implicated by a civil penalty having as its main
purpose a deterrent or punishment effect, Brown, 284 S.W.3d at 339 n.4, and this recognition
was repeated in City of Knoxville v. Kimsey, although the defendant there waived the privilege by
failing to assert it upon proper grounds, Kimsey, 2009 WL 1325719, at *2. This prospect has
some support in the pronouncements of the Tennessee Supreme Court. See, e.g., City of
Chattanooga v. Myers, 787 S.W.2d 921, 926 (Tenn. 1990) (“A perusal of these cases shows that
the decisions in some (e.g. no right against self-incrimination) may now be questionable, but the
Page 5
clear rule to be gleaned from all of these cases is that, as far as general procedural matters and
matters of appeal were concerned, these actions were considered civil in nature.”).
We observe, however, red-light camera enforcement programs adopted in accordance
with Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-198 do not per se violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
“A photograph of a vehicle passing through a public intersection is not testimonial evidence. . . .”
Sevin v. Parish of Jefferson, 621 F. Supp. 2d 372, 382 (E.D. La. 2009). Introduction of such
evidence thus does not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause because that provision protects an
accused “only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State
with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.” Id. at 381-82; Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). Moreover, the Tennessee Court of Appeals has
determined that permitting vehicle owners to shift liability by establishing via affidavit that
someone else was in control of their vehicle at the time of the violation does not amount to a
violation of the privilege. Brown, 284, S.W.3d at 339.
3. To the extent that the procedural guarantee of the right to confrontation applies in
proceedings “traditionally considered to be civil in nature,” but carrying a fine “intended to be
punitive and a deterrent,” id. at 338, the admission of photographic evidence from a traffic
surveillance camera does not, on its face, violate it. The Confrontation Clause covers
“testimonial statements.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009); State
v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287, 301-303 (Tenn. 2008). Photographs are not. Sevin, 621 F. Supp. 2d
at 383 (“Because a camera is not a witness that is amenable to cross-examination, and because a
photograph of a vehicle is not a „testimonial statement, introduction of the Redflex photographs
into evidence does not implicate the Confrontation Clause.”); State v. Williams, 913 S.W.2d 462,
465 (Tenn. 1996) (“Although the language is not identical, both the federal and state
constitutional confrontation provisions are restricted, by their own terms, to „witnesses and do
not encompass physical evidence or objects, such as photographs.”).
As an evidentiary matter, photographs must be properly authenticated to be admissible.
Williams, 913 S.W2d at 465. Pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 901, “[t]he requirement of
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence
sufficient to the court to support a finding by the trier of fact that the matter in question is what
its proponent claims.” Tenn. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). “Even if direct testimony as to foundation
matters is absent . . . the contents of a photograph itself, together with such other circumstantial
or indirect evidence as bears upon the issue, may serve to explain and authenticate a photograph
sufficiently to justify its admission into evidence.” United States v. Rembert, 863 F.2d 1023,
1027 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (internal quotation omitted) (cited with approval in Williams, 913 S.W.2d
at 465). Although we are unable to comment on the authentication procedures followed by any
particular municipal court, photographs of license plates made by an automated system are
unlikely to pose a particularly high evidentiary bar.
Page 6
ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter
GORDON W. SMITH
Associate Solicitor General
JAMES E. GAYLORD
Assistant Attorney General
Requested by:
The Honorable Tony Shipley
State Representative
204 War Memorial Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0194
![]() 08/11/2015 at 20:54 |
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It’ll cost you, ‘cause they’re not cheap, but they block the plate nicely and they can also carry bikes if you’re into that sort of thing.
Sadly they only work on cars with a hitch, unless you want one of the strapped-on versions for your trunk.
As an NC guy, you’ll learn to stay away from all the Barney Fifedoms by not using any road around Bristol that isn’t I-81 or I-26, and you’ll be careful there too.
![]() 08/12/2015 at 09:26 |
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Despite this being an ‘80s Benz, it actually does have a 2” hitch...
![]() 08/14/2015 at 15:26 |
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You’ve probably already done whatever, but in the future, tell the city that you want to take the camera itself to court.